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Abstract
Rationale, aims and objectives We examined the effect of two interventions on both the
reliability and validity of regulatory judgments: adjusting the regulatory instrument and
attending a consensus meeting.
Method We adjusted the regulatory instrument. With a randomized controlled trial (RCT)
we examined the effect of the adjustments we made to the instrument. In the consensus
meeting inspectors discussed cases and had to reach consensus about the order of the cases.
We used a before and after case study to assess the effect of the consensus meeting. We
compared the judgments assigned in the RCT with the unadjusted instrument with the
judgments assigned with the unadjusted instrument after the consensus meeting. Moreover
we explored the effect of increasing the number of inspectors per regulatory visit based on
the estimates of the two interventions.
Results The consensus meeting improved the agreement between inspectors; the variance
between inspectors was smallest (0.03) and the reliability coefficient was highest (0.59).
Validity is assessed by examining the relation between the assigned judgments and the
corporate standard and expressed by a correlation coefficient. This coefficient was highest
after the consensus meeting (0.48). Adjustment of the instrument did not increase reliability
and validity coefficients.
Conclusions Participating in a consensus meeting improved reliability and validity.
Increasing the number of inspectors resulted in both higher reliability and validity values.
Organizing consensus meetings and increasing the number of inspectors per regulatory
visit seem to be valuable interventions for improving regulatory judgments.
Introduction
Government regulation of health care aims to monitor and mini-
mize risks in health care and to simultaneously stimulate the
quality of care. Internationally, the effects of regulation on the
quality of public services have been discussed extensively and
sometimes criticized [1–10]. Scientific research on the effects of
regulation is limited, and generally focuses on the effects of using
quality indicators to improve performance [6,7] and the effects of
enforcement or surveyor styles [11–15]. As a research area, studies
on the reliability and validity of regulatory judgments are still
scarce. Research and publication on this subject is of particular
importance. Inspectors make judgments and decide whether health
care organizations have to improve quality. Both the credibility
and authority of enforcement agencies will be hampered when the
judgments are not reliable or valid. Moreover, scientific publica-
tions on this subject make it possible to exchange knowledge and
learn internationally.
Regulation of health care in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, regulation of health care is performed by the
Dutch Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ). The IGZ is an independent
agency within the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. The IGZ
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safeguards the quality of care and enforces over 20 laws, for
example, the Care Institutions Quality Act [16]. The IGZ aims for
standardized procedures and reliable and valid judgments to
stimulate the quality of care and to justify its regulatory decisions
and activities. Regulators need methods to measure and monitor
the performance of the organizations they regulate, a process
described as ‘detection’ [17]. For this purpose, the IGZ uses a
combination of three methods. First, the IGZ employs regulation
in response to incidents, in the event of emergencies that indicate
structural shortcomings in health care. The second method is
theme-based regulation. This method focuses on specific issues in
health care. Sometimes these issues requiring the regulator’s atten-
tion are put forward by the minister or parliament. Third, since
2002 the IGZ has been using risk-based supervision to assess the
quality of health care by means of indicators [18]. As in countries
like Australia, the United States, Switzerland, Sweden and
Norway, quality indicators were introduced in the Netherlands to
monitor and stimulate the quality of health care [1,19–22]. In
risk-based supervision, a framework for the quality of care and
accompanying sets of quality indicators are drawn up in coopera-
tion with representatives from the health care sector. Subsequently,
risk-based supervision consists of three phases: first, the IGZ
analyses the data collected with the indicators and selects institu-
tions at risk. Next, inspectors visit the selected institutions that are
obliged to cooperate. Inspectors are required to express their
opinion of the examined care. When the quality of care does not
meet the standards of IGZ, institutions have to draw up an
improvement plan and are obliged to improve their care accord-
ingly. If inspectors have any doubt on the improvement plan,
inspectors can decide whether a follow-up visit is necessary.
Finally, if the improvements are not satisfactory, the IGZ can
impose administrative sanctions and initiate penal measures. The
policy of IGZ is that the specific health care sectors represented
within IGZ develop their own regulatory instruments. To gain
insight in the instrument used for regulation of nursing home we
will describe this instrument.
Instrument for regulation of nursing home care
in the Netherlands
The instrument for regulation of nursing home care that is used
since 2008 consists of standards, a framework (including criteria)
and aspects of risk. The standards describe the desired situation in
nursing home care. The framework defines which judgment applies
in which situation according to the criteria. Check marks can be
placed next to the aspects of risks to support the judgment. Because
the standards describe the desired situation for a specific nursing
home criterion, they are formulated positively. In contrast to the
standards, the aspects of risk describe situations considered to be
potential risks and are formulated negatively. The criteria are exam-
ined by inspectors during regulatory visits and judged on a 4-point
scale: ‘no risk’, ‘slight risk’, ‘high risk’ and ‘very high risk’. This
scale runs from positive to negative, with ‘very high risk’ being the
most negative. Inspectors can, but are not required to, check relevant
aspects of risk before they make their judgment. The number of
aspects of risk differs per criteria. For example, the criterion ‘pres-
sure ulcers’ consists of eight aspects of risk (Table 1).
The meaning of the judgments is determined largely by the
aspects of risk, because checking the aspects in essence determines
the meaning of the judgment. As can be seen in Table 1, if one
aspect of risk is checked for the criterion ‘pressure ulcers’, the
judgment ‘slight risk’ is conceivable. The meaning of ‘slight risk’
depends on which aspect has been checked. This implies that
‘slight risk’ can have at least eight different meanings, because
eight different aspects of risk can be checked for pressure ulcers.
In addition, other arguments (both defined and non-defined) can
also decide whether the judgment ‘slight risk’ applies. This implies
that there can be endless variations to the meaning of ‘slight risk’
and therefore the meaning is unclear. This can hamper the validity
of the judgment. Consequently, inspectors are not satisfied with the
instrument as it is.
Aim of the study
Earlier research on regulation of health care in the Netherlands
shows that the reliability and validity of regulatory judgments can
be improved [23,24]. In the scientific literature on reliability, the
main approach to increasing reliability seems to involve increasing
the number of observers and improving the instrument used [25].
Literature on interventions used by regulatory authorities to
improve their judgments is still scarce. Fortunately, improving
inter-rater reliability is an important part of other professions as
well. Earlier research shows that empirical studies on interventions
to improve reliability are an integral part of improving medical
practice [26], and that the main approach of improving reliability
as described in the literature can be complemented by two other
interventions: training the users of diagnostic instruments and the
combination of improving the instrument and training the users
[26].
The methods of training vary, but all focus on the identification
on sources of disagreement. The outcomes of the studies on health
care professionals seem relevant for health care inspectors because
the characteristics of health care inspectors resemble those of
health care professionals: inspectors are professionals as well, and
also have health care backgrounds. However, there are differences
as well: inspectors assess organizations instead of patients, using
instruments such as written criteria or standards instead of highly
technical instruments such as computed tomography scans [27].
Our main research questions concern the effects of:
1 adjustment of the regulatory instrument on the reliability and
validity of regulatory judgments.
2 attending a consensus meeting on the reliability and validity of
regulatory judgments.
Furthermore, based on the results the effect of increasing the
number of inspectors on the reliability and validity was estimated.
We performed an experimental study to answer our research
questions.
Methods
Adjusting the regulatory instrument
We organized an expert meeting with four experienced inspectors
for nursing home care regulation to make an inventory of
the desired adjustments. This meeting focused on two of the
instrument’s criteria: ‘pressure ulcers’ and ‘professionalism of the
staff’. We have chosen these criteria for two reasons. First, earlier
research showed that rating the ‘pressure ulcer’ criterion can be
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very difficult [24]. Second, the ‘professionalism of the staff’ cri-
terion is a new one in the instrument and turned out to be hard to
judge [28]. The experts evaluated the criteria on three dimensions:
the clarity of the definition of the aspects of risks, the extent to
which the aspects of risk cover situations in nursing homes and the
scoring methodology. This resulted in an inventory of possible
adjustments to the instrument. As a result of this expert meeting,
we selected two adjustments:
1 We formulated the description of the aspects of risk for pressure
ulcers and professionalism of the staff positively rather than nega-
tively. In this manner, both the description of the standard and the
aspects are formulated positively.
2 We made checking the aspects of risk mandatory.
After the expert meeting, we used a randomized controlled trial
to examine the effect of the adjustments. We randomly assigned
the inspectors (n = 25) to group 1 and group 2 (see Figure 1). The
inspectors in group 1 used the unadjusted instrument, and the
inspectors in group 2 used the adjusted instrument. Inspectors in
both groups examined 16 identical cases within 6 weeks. Eight of
the cases concerned pressure ulcers and eight cases concerned the
professionalism of the nursing home staff. To increase response
among the inspectors, we sent two reminders for both the first and
second measurements. In the end, nine inspectors used the
adjusted instrument and 15 inspectors used the unadjusted instru-
ment. To examine the effect of the adjustments, we compared the
judgments assigned with the unadjusted instrument to the judg-
ments assigned with the adjusted instrument.
Participating in a consensus meeting
To gain insight into the effect of participating in a consensus
meeting, we used a before and after design (see Figure 1). Four
weeks after the randomized clinical trial we organized a consensus
meeting for the inspectors (n = 25) to identify common sources of
variation. Therefore, the inspectors had to reach consensus about
the order of two sets of four cases, which had to ascend from ‘no
risk’ to ‘very high risk’. They classified four cases for the criterion
‘pressure ulcers’ and four cases for ‘professionalism of the staff’ in
order of severity of risks using the unadjusted instrument. First,
they read the cases for one criterion to make an individual judg-
ment. Next, the inspectors had to reach consensus about the order
of the cases. The cases were presented on large wheeled boards. In
this way, the inspectors could easily gather around the cases,
discuss them and change their order. They were only allowed to
change the order if there was consensus about how to replace a
case. The inspectors had to state their arguments so that all par-
ticipants joined in the discussion. They had to reach consensus
within a time limit of 30 minutes per criterion. At the end of the
session, one of the inspectors had to present the order of the cases
and give the arguments that led them to decide on the order. The
sources of variation were explained as well. Except for the time
limit, no further instructions were given on how the inspectors
were to reach consensus. Two of the researchers attended the
consensus meeting, clarified the purpose of the meeting and
observed the participants without intervening. We videotaped
these meetings.
Of the 25 inspectors, 15 inspectors attended the consensus
meeting (60%) and all of these 15 inspectors (100%) examined the
16 cases after the consensus meeting with the unadjusted instru-
ment within 6 weeks (group 3). These cases were very similar to
the cases used in the randomized controlled trial described above,
but not completely identical to prevent learning effects. This
second round of review was conducted after a significant period of
time had elapsed following the randomized controlled trial (6
weeks); this was performed to prevent recollection, which would
have introduced bias into the review process [29]. We compared
the judgments of group 3 with the judgments of group 1 in the
randomized controlled trail described above.
Case descriptions
In both the randomized controlled trial and the before and after
study, inspectors examined cases and assigned regulatory judg-
ments to the situations described in these cases. The cases con-
cerned two criteria: 16 of the cases described the criterion
‘pressure ulcers’ and 16 cases described ‘professionalism of the
staff’. This study focuses on regulatory judgments assigned within
the system of risk-based supervision of nursing home care in the
Netherlands. In this system, inspectors visit a selection of health
care institutions consisting mainly of institutions at risk. This
selection means that the institutions visited do not vary widely
with respect to the risk score on the indicators. This implies that
the inspectors visit and examine institutions that cover only a small
part of the spectrum; they visit institutions that perform relatively
less good on the indicators. As a result, it is necessary to measure
very accurately to be able to expose small differences between
these institutions. This implies strict requirements of the regula-
tory instruments and the inspectors.
Random allocaƟon
inspectors (n=25)
IntervenƟon 1
AdjusƟng the
regulatory
instrument
Group 1
Unadjusted
instrument
(n=15)
Group 3
Inspectors
discuss cases
with
unadjusted
instrument 
(n=15)
Group 3
Inspectors examine
cases with
unadjusted
instrument aŌer
consensus
meeƟng(n=15)
Group 2
Adjusted
instrument 
(n=9)
IntervenƟon 2
AƩending a
consensus
meeƟng
Figure 1 Research design of the study.
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In this experiment, we tried to simulate this situation in an
optimal way using only cases that also represented just a small part
of the spectrum: cases that corresponded to the scoring categories
‘slight risk’ and ‘high risk’. We developed the cases using descrip-
tions of situations from regulatory reports of nursing home visits in
2008, and validated them. The best test for validity would compare
the results of a measurement process with a ‘true score’ [29]. To
develop such a gold standard, three former nursing home care
inspectors rated all cases. These inspectors read the cases indepen-
dently and assigned scores based on the 4-point scale. They did not
always agree on all cases. These cases were discussed and rewrit-
ten to reach consensus on the level of risk. Box 1 presents an
example of such a case.
The inspectors examined cases individually online using a web-
based survey. This technology made it possible to prevent inspec-
tors from returning to a previous case once they had judged it. In
this manner, we attempted to make it harder for the inspectors to
mutually compare cases and stimulate inspectors to rely more on
the regulatory instrument. Moreover, with this technology we
made sure that inspectors had to check the required parts of the
study before they were able to go on to the next case. This was
necessary to be able to examine the effect of the requirement to
check aspects of risk. In addition, with this technology we
attempted to reduce the chances of missing data. Although we
presented the cases randomly to prevent effects of sequence, the
order in which every observer examined them was similar.
Because inspectors examined the cases at different locations, we
minimized the possibility of discussing the cases simultaneously.
The inspectors who dropped out withdrew themselves from the
study despite the reminders we sent.
Increasing the number of inspectors per
regulatory visit
The effect of the manipulation can be described by the agreement
between inspectors (reliability) and by the correspondence
between the assigned judgments and the corporate standard (valid-
ity). For both the effect of increasing the number of inspectors was
estimated.
We calculated the effect of increasing the number of inspectors
who examined the same cases on the reliability and validity of the
regulatory judgments within the conditions of the experimental
setting. We calculated reliability and validity when two inspectors
examined the same cases, when three inspectors examined the
same cases, and so on, up to a total of 10 inspectors. The values
calculated represent the values that can be obtained when the
requirements of the experimental setting are met. In this study, this
implies that the inspectors do not talk with each other while they
are examining the cases.
Statistical analysis
The data collected in the experiments are hierarchical in nature, as
ratings are nested both within inspectors and cases; randomly
chosen ratings of the same inspector are more alike than randomly
chosen ratings of randomly chosen inspectors. The same holds for
the ratings of the same cases. The results of this study have to be
generalizable over both inspectors and cases. Therefore, we need
to estimate three components of variance: the variance between
cases, the variance between inspectors (the extent to which inspec-
tors differ in their judgments on a case about nursing home care)
and the interaction between inspectors and cases that is repre-
sented by error variance. Note that both error variance and inspec-
tor variance are indications of the reliability of the ratings.
We are interested in the three components of variance and the
proportion between these components to be able to compare
between the interventions. Moreover, we were interested in the
overall effect that is represented by the reliability coefficient (rho).
To calculate rho we used the formula [30] presented in Box 2.
However, we were not interested only in the effect of the inter-
ventions on reliability, but on validity as well. Therefore, not only
the variances but also the mean differences between the actual
judgments and the corporate judgment (which corresponds with
the IGZ’s corporate standards) are relevant, as they indicate
whether the actual judgments differ from the corporate judgments.
To examine the effect of the interventions on validity, we con-
structed a new variable that represented the gold standard in this
study: corporate judgment. This is the judgment that was assigned
by the four experts during the expert meeting when the cases were
validated. This made it possible to compare the corporate judg-
ments and the judgments assigned by the inspectors during the
experiment, and we were able to examine the effect of the inter-
ventions on reliability as well as on validity at the same time. First,
we analysed which model fit our data best. Second, we analysed
the data to gain insight into the means and the proportion of
variances of the judgments for the three conditions with respect to
Box 1 Case on pressure ulcers (representing ‘high risk’ according to the IGZ corporate standards)
The Sparrow is a nursing home with 25 beds. The atmosphere seemed a little cool. The new cluster manager, who started his job in March 2008,
stated that the employees are involved in the delivered care. The IGZ noticed that the volume of the television in the shared living room was very
loud. The Sparrow’s financial position has improved recently: the deficit has been reduced. The numbers of reported falling incidents and
medication errors have been stable for years. The IGZ finds this a conspicuous fact.
The Sparrow does not use a protocol for pressure ulcers. However, general instructions for coping with pressure ulcers are present. In the
interview that took place, it was said that a digital protocol for pressure ulcers was being developed that will be available via intranet. The
prevalence of pressure ulcers is measured within the scope of high-quality and safe care in nursing homes. The outcomes of the measurement
are not currently in use. Early signs that can indicate the presence or development of pressure ulcers are not recorded. The prevention of pressure
ulcers takes place by purchasing preventive materials in the short term, and by changing the lying position of residents at risk for pressure ulcers.
The Sparrow does not facilitate education on the subject of pressure ulcers. Agreements were made about recording the treatment of pressure
ulcers. These agreements were present in two of the four files examined. Although pressure ulcers are diagnosed by a multidisciplinary team,
the agreements made are not always carried out.
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reliability. Third, we analysed the data to gain insight into the
relationship between the corporate judgment and the actual judg-
ment for the four conditions. Fourth, we calculated the effect of
increasing the number of inspectors on reliability and validity.
Results
In this section we will first describe the outcomes of the identifi-
cation of sources of variation in the consensus meeting. Next, we
will explain the results of the experiments.
The results of the consensus meeting are presented in Box 3.
Box 1 shows that the inspectors came up with many different
arguments to reach consensus and identified different sources
of variation. Some of the sources are focused mainly on the
instrument [1,3–6,9,12], whereas others are more general
[2,7,8,10,11,13,14]. For example, whether a regulatory visit is an
instantaneous sample or part of the health care organization’s
long-term development is a more general point of difference.
Choosing not to write a report as a strategy for letting the institu-
tions improve on their own is a more personal type of variation.
Effects of the interventions are presented. The fit of the models
is presented in Table 2.
In the first model (the equal reliability model) neither variance
was allowed to differ between conditions. In the second model
(the different error model), the error variance was allowed to
differ between conditions. If this model fits best, the reliability
varies as a result of error variance. In the third model (the dif-
ferent variance and error model), the variance between inspectors
was allowed as well. If this model fits best, the reliability varies
as a result of variance between inspectors as well.
The results indicate that −2LL of model 1 is significantly
higher compared with the −2LL of model 2 [χ2 = 75.24; degrees
of freedom (d.f.) = 5; P < 0.0001]. Yet, the third model fits
better to the observed data as model 2 (χ2 = 74.85; d.f. = 6;
P < 0.0001). Hence, the variance between inspectors as well
as the error variance differs between measurements. The esti-
mated variances of model 3 give insight into the effect of the
interventions on reliability (Table 3) and validity (Table 4). In
Tables 4 and 5 the effects of the adjustment of the instrument
and the effect of the consensus meeting are presented. The
calculated effects represent the values of the judgment of
one inspector assigned with the unadjusted instrument, assigned
with the adjusted instrument and assigned after the consensus
meeting.
Box 2 Formula used to calculate rho
ρ =
+
variance between cases
variance between cases variance between inspectors
N
residual variance
N Ninspectors inspectors cases
+
*
Box 3 Sources of variation
1 Some inspectors focus mainly on the aspects of risk presented in the instrument; others make tactical choices as well, and involve the context
when they make a judgment.
2 Some inspectors think of a regulatory visit as an instantaneous sample; others think of it as part of the long-term developments of the health
care organization.
3 The level of palpability of the criterion is important. Inspectors experience the criterion ‘pressure ulcers’ as concrete in contrast with the
criterion ‘professionalism of the staff’.
4 The validity of the instrument plays a part in how it is used. Inspectors do not agree whether it can be stated unequivocally that a very high
risk is present for the care delivered if a nursing home does not meet the standards for good care.
5 The size of the organization in terms of the number of beds is not part of the instrument’s criteria, nor is it explained how inspectors can
account for an organization’s size.
6 How the information in the instrument is formulated plays a part in the inspectors’ judgments.
7 A regulatory judgment is not clinical, but is always based on the inspector’s experience and knowledge. Inspectors’ frames of reference vary,
and play a role in judging an organization.
8 Some inspectors focus on details, whereas others focus on the main points.
9 Some possibilities for improving the instrument:
• The instrument is too unstable in relation to the subjects and application.
• The instrument is ambiguous and unclear on some points.
• Does the subject of the instrument actually reveal risks in health care?
10 Some inspectors consider the instrument a decision-making aid, whereas others consider it to be an end in itself.
11 Some inspectors would like to start a regulatory report by explaining why some of the instrument’s modules were either discussed or not
discussed during the regulatory visit.
12 Some inspectors object to scoring ‘no risk’, and never assign this score.
13 Some inspectors prefer the strategy of building credits with an institution, and do not assign the score ‘very high risk’ for this reason. Other
inspectors are convinced that the frame of reference is determined for the scores they assign. If in their experience a judgment has not had
the foreseen effect, they assign scores in a different manner.
14 Sometimes inspectors choose not to write a report on the regulatory visit. Instead they give the institution the chance to improve the care.
These inspectors think this strategy is more effective compared with assigning a lot of ‘very high risk’ scores.
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Table 3 shows that if one rater rates ‘professionalism’, the reli-
ability is estimated as 0.47 if the unadjusted instrument is used.
When one inspector assigns a judgment with the adjusted instru-
ment, the reliability increases to 0.48. When one inspector
assigns a judgment after the consensus meeting, the reliability
has increased to 0.59. Table 3 shows for both the cases on pro-
fessionalism and on pressure ulcers the mean judgment assigned
after the consensus meeting was higher (more stringent) com-
pared with the other conditions. The error variance for cases on
professionalism was relatively small when the adjusted instru-
ment was used (0.22) and after the consensus meeting (0.26).
This is also represented in the percentages of variance: the per-
centage of error variance was relatively small when the adjusted
instrument was used (26%) and after the consensus meeting
(37%) compared with the percentage of error variance when the
unadjusted instrument was used (44%). Moreover, inspector vari-
ance was relatively small after the consensus meeting (0.03)
compared with both the condition in which the unadjusted instru-
ment was used (0.08) and the condition in which the adjusted
instrument was used (0.22). This means that the mean differ-
ences between inspectors were relatively small after the consen-
sus meeting. This is also depicted in the percentage of inspector
variance, which explains the inspectors’ part in the total amount
of variance: after the consensus meeting, 4% of the total variance
can be explained by inspectors for the case on professionalism.
The reliability coefficient was also highest after the consensus
meeting (0.59). The percentage of variance explained by inspec-
tors when the unadjusted instrument was used (9%) was rela-
tively small compared with the percentage of variance explained
by cases (47%) or error (44%). To be able to examine the effect
of the interventions on the validity of the judgments, we calcu-
lated the mean difference between the judgments assigned by the
inspectors and the corporate judgment. In Table 4 the parameter
estimates of model 3 are presented.
Table 2 Outcomes of the comparison of the
three models used to represent our data
−2 log likelihood
Comparison
Model χ2 d.f. P
1. Equal reliability model 1268.73 Model 1 with model 2 75.24 5 <0.0001
2. Different error model 1193.49 Model 2 with model 3 74.85 6 <0.0001
3. Different variance and
error model
1118.65
d.f., degrees of freedom.
Table 3 The effect of adjusting the
instrument and a consensus meeting on
inter-rater reliability for the three conditions
Mean (CI) S2error (%) S2inspector (%) S2case (%); rho
Cases on professionalism
Unadjusted 2.12 (1.75; 2.50) 0.39(44) 0.08 (9) 0.41 (47); 0.47
Adjusted 3.27 (2.82; 3.72) 0.22 (26) 0.22 (26) 0.41 (48); 0.48
Consensus 3.81 (3.48; 4.14) 0.26 (37) 0.03 (4) 0.41 (59); 0.59
Cases on pressure ulcers
Unadjusted 2.51 (2.18; 2.84) 0.61 (62) 0.02 (2) 0.35 (35); 0.35
Adjusted 2.93 (2.53; 3.34) 0.39 (45) 0.14 (16) 0.35 (40); 0.40
Consensus 2.99 (2.63; 3.30) 0.24 (38) 0.05 (8) 0.35 (54); 0.54
% case, percentage of variance explained by cases; % error, percentage of variance explained by
error; % inspector, percentage of variance explained by inspectors; CI, 80% confidence intervals;
rho, mean reliability when one inspector examines a case; S2case, variance of cases; S2error, variance
of inspectors and cases; S2inspector, variance of inspectors.
Table 4 The effect of adjusting the
instrument and a consensus meeting on
validity for the three conditions
Mean difference (CI) S2error (%) S2inspector (%) S2case (%); rho
Cases on professionalism
Unadjusted −0.26 (−0.59; 0.07) 0.49 (59) 0.07 (8) 0.28 (34); 0.34
Adjusted 0.77 (0.38; 1.16) 0.21 (30) 0.21 (30) 0.28 (40); 0.40
Consensus 0.85 (0.57; 1.12) 0.27 (47) 0.03 (5) 0.28 (48); 0.48
Cases on pressure ulcers
Unadjusted −0.06 (−0.22; 0.1) 0.38 (59) 0.04 (6) 0.23 (35); 0.35
Adjusted 0.43 (0.19; 0.67) 0.40 (53) 0.13 (17) 0.23 (30); 0.30
Consensus 0.37 (0.24; 0.5) 0.23 (46) 0.05 (9) 0.23 (45); 0.45
% case, percentage of variance explained by cases; % error, percentage of variance explained by
error; % inspector, percentage of variance explained by inspectors; CI, 80% confidence intervals;
rho, mean reliability when one inspector examines a case; S2case, variance of cases; S2error, variance
of inspectors and cases; S2inspector, variance of inspectors.
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For both the cases on professionalism and on pressure ulcers,
the mean judgment assigned with the unadjusted instrument was
lower (more lenient) compared with the corporate judgment,
which was expressed by a negative mean difference. Inspectors
who used the adjusted instrument and inspectors who participated
in the consensus meeting assigned higher scores (were more strin-
gent), which was expressed by a positive mean difference. The
percentage of error differed between the conditions, but was rela-
tively high when inspectors used the unadjusted instrument (59%)
compared with the percentage of error after the consensus meeting
(47%). Inspector variance was relatively small after the consensus
meeting (0.03) compared with both the pretest when the unad-
justed instrument was used (0.07) and when the adjusted instru-
ment was used (0.21). This is also depicted in the percentages of
inspector variance that explain the total amount of variance: after
the consensus meeting the percentage of inspector variance was
relatively small (5%) compared with the pretest when the unad-
justed instrument was used (8%) and the condition in which the
adjusted instrument was used (30%). This might be explained by
the fact that the adjusted instrument was new for the inspectors and
they were not educated in the use of the new instrument. The
correlation coefficient to express the correlation between the
assigned judgment and the corporate judgment was highest after
the consensus meeting (0.48). To be able to gain insight into the
effect of increasing the number of inspectors on the reliability and
validity of judgments for the different conditions, we calculated
the reliability coefficient (rho) for different numbers of inspectors
(Fig. 2).
Figure 2a shows that when the number of inspectors increases,
reliability increases as well. The increase of rho varies between
conditions. Figure 2b shows that when the number of inspectors
increases, the correlation coefficient between the assigned judg-
ment and the corporate judgments increases as well. The increase
varies between conditions. The highest increase is effected on both
reliability and validity in the condition after the consensus
meeting. Figure 2a,b show that the effect of the increase of inspec-
tors declines after three inspectors.
Discussion
In this study our research questions concerned the effects of:
1 adjustment of the regulatory instrument on the reliability and
validity of regulatory judgments.
2 attending a consensus meeting on the reliability and validity of
regulatory judgments.
Furthermore, we estimated the effect of increasing the number
of inspectors on the reliability and validity of regulatory judgments
based on the results of the experiment.
We conclude that the consensus meeting, adjusting the instru-
ment and increasing the number of inspectors per examined case,
all influenced the mean judgments and components of variance.
Because error variance was relatively small and rho was relatively
large after the consensus meeting, we conclude that the consensus
meeting results in more homogeneous judgments compared with
adjusting the instrument. The results indicate that participating in
a consensus meeting and increasing the number of inspectors per
examined case improved reliability and validity.
Moreover, when inspectors used the adjusted instrument,
inspector variance was larger compared with the unadjusted instru-
ment. This implies that inspectors who used the adjusted instru-
ment are less mutually interchangeable when the adjusted
instrument is used. The mean difference of the judgments was
negative when the unadjusted instrument was used. This implies
that when the unadjusted instrument is used, the assigned judg-
ments are more lenient compared with the corporate judgments.
Earlier research has confirmed this tendency towards false-positive
judgments [28]. Based on the estimates of the variances we
obtained from the results of the consensus meeting and adjusting
the instrument, we explored the effect of increasing the number of
inspectors who examined similar cases.
The calculations we made to explore the effect of the increase in
the number of inspectors on reliability and validity presume that
groups of inspectors assign scores to similar cases under the same
condition as in our case study: they do not speak with each other
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Figure 2 (a, b) The effect of increasing the number of inspectors on the
reliability and validity of regulatory judgments.
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about their scores when examining the cases. However, it seems
unrealistic to expect that, when visiting in pairs or teams, inspec-
tors will not discuss their observations with each other. Therefore,
it seems reasonable to expect that, in actual practice (when inspec-
tors do speak with each other about their scores), the increase in
the reliability of the regulatory judgments will be higher.
Although based on earlier research [26] we expected that adjust-
ing the instrument would improve reliability and validity, we were
not able to confirm this in our study. With respect to the reliability
coefficients after the consensus meeting, we conclude that a rela-
tively high percentage of variance of judgments is still not repre-
sentative of variation between institutions. This might have to do
with the system of risk-based supervision, which is characterized
by visiting only a selection of institutions at risk that do not vary
widely with respect to the risk score on the indicators. We
simulated this using cases that represented only ‘slight risk’ and
‘high risk’. The reliability coefficient after the consensus meeting
indicates that examining cases that cover only a small part of the
spectrum is very complex indeed.
Strengths and limitations
This study has several strengths. First, to our knowledge, this is the
first study to investigate the effect of interventions on inter-rater
reliability and validity of health care inspectors. Second, in an
experimental design in which cases are examined there is always a
risk of recall effect and learning effect, which might affect the
results. We attempted to limit these effects as much as possible by
developing very similar but not completely identical cases for the
first and second measurements, and planning 6 weeks between
them. Third, the best test for validity is to compare the results of a
measurement process with a ‘true score’ [29]. To develop such a
standard, we developed a proxy we referred to as the gold stand-
ard. We adjusted the cases in the experiment to approximate valid-
ity. Fourth, the inspectors examined cases individually online
using a web-based survey. This technique made it possible to
prevent inspectors from returning to a previous case once they had
judged it. In this manner, we attempted to make it more difficult for
inspectors to mutually compare individual cases and simulta-
neously stimulate inspectors to rely on the regulatory instrument.
In addition, with this technique we attempted to reduce the
chances of missing data. Because inspectors examined the cases at
different locations, we minimized the possibility of discussing the
cases simultaneously.
Limitations to the study should also be considered, because they
may affect the results. First, although using cases to examine
inter-rater reliability is very common, this might have affected the
results. After all, no matter how well designed the cases are, they
will never be completely identical to the complexity of reality. In
this study, we experienced quite a lot of resistance to the use of
cases. Second, because study participants may have the tendency
to concentrate particularly when they are aware they are partici-
pating in an experiment, the Hawthorne effect might be present.
Third, in experimental designs it is recommended that every par-
ticipant examine the cases in a random order, and this order differs
among participants to prevent effects of sequence. In our study,
although the cases were presented randomly, the order in which
the cases appeared online did not vary among inspectors due to the
web-based technique that was used. Moreover, the dropout rate in
this experiment was not random. It is remarkable that despite the
fact that management strongly supported this experiment, some
members of the organization withdrew from the study.
Implications
Despite the methodological limitations of our study, it does have
some implications and offers the possibility of providing opportu-
nities for further improvement of regulatory judgments. Our
results indicate that mandatory participation in a consensus
meeting and increasing the number of inspectors per regulatory
visit improves the reliability and validity of regulatory judgments.
The results show that the way we adjusted the regulatory instru-
ment did not improve reliability and validity. Almost all regulators
use standards to state their expectations to other stakeholders in
regulation, the most obvious being the organizations they regulate
[27]. Training inspectors how to use instruments and bring about
consensus on employing such standards is important for reliable
and valid judgments. Maybe it was naïve to expect that adjusting
the instrument without explicitly training the inspectors to use the
new instrument would result in higher agreement or validity.
Future research
The results indicate that the reliability coefficient after the consen-
sus meeting is still not yet optimal. The consensus meeting of our
study was mainly focused on identifying sources of variation.
Although this focus was an integral part of the consensus meetings
studied earlier, the manner in which the outcomes of the consensus
meetings were used differed among studies [26]. Because some of
the sources of variation in this study were quite fundamental, it
might be necessary to develop conventions to be able to further
improve reliability. This seems a rational continuation for future
research on this subject. In addition, we only examined two types
of adjustments to the regulatory instrument in this study, without
training the inspectors to use the new instrument. It could be
valuable to investigate how other adjustments to regulatory instru-
ments can accomplish improving the reliability and validity of
the regulatory judgments in combination with training in using
the instrument. Third, we examined the effect of increasing the
number of inspectors in an experimental setting. This implies that
the calculated values represent the reliability and validity of regu-
latory judgments when inspectors do not discuss their observations
before they make a judgment. Because it seems unrealistic to
expect that inspectors will meet these requirements in daily prac-
tice, it is worth examining the effect of increasing the number of
inspectors during actual regulatory visits. Moreover, when inspec-
tors visit institutions in pairs or teams, there is a risk of unwanted
side effects. As a result of the dynamics in pairs of inspectors (e.g.
factors like dominance, seniority, status and the ability to argue
[31]), the agreement between pairs of inspectors or between
inspectors of a regulatory region about a judgment can increase,
but this does not necessarily imply that the judgment is valid.
Therefore, future research on optimal conditions for inspectors to
visit health care institutions in increasing numbers would be a
valuable continuation of this study.
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